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ABSTRACT
In this paper we report a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol using multimode coherent states generated on
subcarrier frequencies of the optical spectrum. To detect the quadrature components of bosonic field we propose a coherent
detection scheme where power from a carrier wave is used as a local oscillator. We compose a mathematical model of
the proposed scheme and perform its security analysis in the finite-size regime using fully quantum asymptotic equipartition
property technique. We calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate for the system under the assumption that the quantum
channel noise is negligible compared to detector dark counts, and an eavesdropper is restricted to collective attacks. Our
calculation shows that the current realistic system implementation would allow distributing secret keys over channels with
losses up to 9 dB.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of sharing symmetric cryptographic keys between two parties that is based on
encoding information in the states of quantum objects and subsequent distillation of the key through a classic communication
channel. The first quantum cryptography protocols exploited the quantum system with degrees of freedoms1–3. A numerous
amount of different techniques for security proofs for discrete variable QKD systems has already been presented4–13. Experi-
mental implementations of this family of QKD protocols rely on single-photon detectors for quantum state measurements.
In turn, continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD), which was proposed later, relies on methods of coherent detection, homo-
dyne or heterodyne, for gaining information about the quantum states. In other words, single-photon detection is replaced
by conventional optical communication methods. However, security proofs for CV-QKD protocols currently remain less
advanced14,15.
There are two types of CV protocols that differ by signal modulation method: Gaussian16,17, where the complex am-
plitudes of coherent states are selected randomly from a normal distribution, and discrete modulation (DM)18–22 with weak
coherent phase-coded states. Other CV-QKD protocols are based on two-mode squeezed vacuum states transmission and
measurement via homodyne or heterodyne detection23. Security proofs for Gaussian CV-QKD protocols remain the most
developed: they were presented against general attacks in the finite key regime using several different approaches24. Security
analysis for CV-QKD protocol with two-mode squeezed vacuum states was also performed25,26. Discrete-variable CV-QKD
protocols possess several important advantages; among those are relative implementation simplicity and a possibility to min-
imize the number of parameters that need to be monitored. Nevertheless, security proofs for discrete-modulation CV-QKD
systems require special consideration. In the asymptotic limit, its security has been proven against collective attacks27. Re-
cently it was shown that security proof for CV-QKD with discrete modulation against general attacks is possible27.
Here we propose an implementation of CV-QKD protocol based on subcarrier wave (SCW) technique28–36. A defining
property of subcarrier wave DV-QKD is the method for quantum state encoding. In it, a strong monochromatic wave emitted
by a laser is modulated in an electro-optical phase modulator to produce weak sidebands, whose phase with respect to the
strong (carrier) wave encodes quantum information (for more details, see Ref. [Gleim2016]). Like in any other DV-QKD
systems, in SCW QKD the weak radiation component is detected by a single photon counter, and the measured observable has
a discrete spectrum. In SCW CV-QKD protocol described in this work, Alice prepares coherent multimode states, which are
defined as quadratures of the bosonic field, while Bob performs coherent detection to establish correlations with Alice. We
also propose a new scheme for detecting quadrature components of the bosonic field, the main advantage of which is using
the carrier wave (an essential part of SCW methodology) as a local oscillator. In practice, it solves the well-known problem of
transmitting the local oscillator through the quantum channel (or its generation on receiver’s side). This is a novel approach
that has not been discussed in previous works dedicated to studying multimode CV QKD.37–39.
From telecommunication point of view, SCW approach possesses several additional advantages. Firstly, it is intrinsically
robust against external conditions affecting the fiber and is ready to function in conventional telecom infrastructure. Secondly,
it demonstrates unmatched spectral efficiency in the quantum channel, allowing for distributing several keys on separate
closely-packed sidebands around a single optical carrier29. Thirdly, recent experiments40 have shown that preservation of
SCW quantum signal parameters in respect to the carrier allows transmitting phase-encoded quantum signals through the
air providing invariance to telescope rotation that remains an important obstacle in traditional polarization-based free-space
quantum communication, making the same QKD kit suitable for fiber and free-space QKD networks. Security proof of SCW
QKD protocol with discrete variables against collective beam-splitting attack was proposed in36, and more recently general
finite-key security proof was presented in41.
A major difference of SCW approach from the previous CV-QKD protocols is using multimode coherent states generated
on subcarrier frequencies. It therefore requires special consideration of security proof technique for the CV-QKD protocol.
The most advanced security descriptions for typical CV-QKD protocolswith Gaussian and discrete modulation assume that the
quantum channel has losses and imposes Gaussian noise on the observed quadrature distributions. For CV-QKD this usually
requires estimating a covariance matrix of the bipartite state shared by Alice and Bob24. In Gaussian modulation protocols the
variances and covariances directly measured by Alice and Bob give a covariance matrix. In case of DM protocols it is harder
to obtain, but in27 a major step towards the full security proof of DM CV-QKD has been presented. The lower bound against
collective attacks is calculated by solving a semidefinite program that computes the covariance matrix of the state shared by
Alice and Bob in the entanglement-based version of the protocol. Our aim in this work is to demonstrate universality of CV-
QKD protocol based on SCW technique. Hence we build a mathematical model of CV-QKD protocol based on SCW method
and show the possibility of performing security proof analysis in case of multimode coherent states. Unconditional security
proof is out of scope of this paper and will be a subject for a separate study. Here we perform finite-key security analysis
using fully quantum asymptotic equipartition property technique8 and calculate the lower bound on secret key rate under the
assumption that detector dark counts remain a dominant contribution to the total noise level20. The key rates are obtained for
direct reconciliation scheme with post-selection in case of collective attacks.
Results
Subcarrier wave CV-QKD setup
In SCW method the signal photons are not emitted directly by a laser source but are generated on subcarrier frequencies, or
sidebands, in course of phase modulation of an intense optical carrier. Laser source emits coherent light with frequency ω .
Alice modulates this beam in a traveling wave electro-optical phase modulator with the microwave field with frequency Ω and
phase ϕA
42. As a result, pairs of sidebands are formed at frequencies ωk = ω + kΩ, where integer k runs between the limits:
−S ≤ k ≤ S. Modulation index at Alice side is chosen so that the total number of photons in the sidebands is less than unity.
In the proposed SCW CV-QKD setup shown in Fig. 1 Alice sends encoded weak coherent states along with the carrier
through a quantum channel. Receiver (Bob) applies much higher modulation index than Alice on his modulator introducing
phase shift ϕB ∈ {0, pi/2} in each transmission window T . Therefore, photon number on the sidebands becomes almost
identical to the more intense carrier wave. In Bob’s phase modulator interference is observed at frequencies ωk = ω + kΩ
under the condition of equal microwave field frequencies Ω used by Alice and Bob. Resulting carrier wave power depends
on the difference between ϕA and ϕB. In case of constructive (ϕB = ϕA) or destructive (ϕB = −ϕA) interference, it becomes
either more or less than the power level on the sidebands (see Fig. 1). A narrow spectral filter then separates the carrier from
the sidebands. Finally, Bob uses a balanced detector for directing the sidebands to one photodiode, and the carrier to another.
On the balanced detector the output information signal is doubled. Coherent detection scheme employed here is similar to
homodyne detection: the weak signal on sidebands mixes with a local oscillator, and each sideband interferes independently.
Resulting subcarrier and carrier power depends on the relative phase between the signal mode and the local oscillator. As in
homodyne detection, Bob measures only one quadrature component at a time.
The protocol consists of the following steps:
1. Alice prepares a multimode coherent state |ψ0(ϕA)〉=
⊗S
k=−S |αk(ϕA)〉k by choosing from a finite set of states (4 states
is in our case). She assumes |ψ0(0)〉, |ψ0(pi/2)〉 as "0" and |ψ0(pi)〉, |ψ0(3pi/2)〉 as "1".
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Figure 1. Principal scheme of SCW CV-QKD setup. PSM is an electro-optical phase modulator; VOA is a variable optical
attenuator; SF is a spectral filter that cuts off the carrier; PD is a photodiode. Diagrams in circles show the absolute value of
signal spectrum taking into account only the first-order subcarriers. Diagrams in squares illustrate the absolute value of
signal spectrum and comparison of spectra for various phase shifts; different coherent states are shown on phase plane.
2. Bob measures the received state in one of two bases: xk or pk. We define the quadratures as:
xk =
1
2
(ak + a
†
k)
pk =
1
2i
(ak − a†k),
(1)
where ak and a
†
k are annihilation and creation operators for mode k, respectively, with commutation relation [aν ,a
†
µ ] =
δν,µ . Commutator for xk and pk is expressed as [xk, pk] = i/2, so the uncertainty relation is δxkδ pk ≥ 1/4.
Interference in the Bob’s module (see "Quantum state preparation" and "Detection" sections) occurs between the cor-
responding modes, thus the described relations are not violated. Bob measures one of the quadratures by homodyne
detection methods. The procedures described above are repeated required (large) number of times.
3. For each time instance, Alice and Bob reveal their selected bases, and mismatched bases are discarded. Bob forms his
bit string by assigning 0 for negative v and 1 for the positive v values in measurement results. The threshold values are
selected to maximize the secure key rate.
4. Alice and Bob apply error correction and privacy amplification procedures. In this paper, we consider only the case of
direct reconciliation (DR), when Bob adjusts his data in accordance with the data of Alice. As a result, the secure secret
key is distributed.
Quantum state preparation
The states prepared by Alice can be described in terms of representation basis of abelian cyclic point symmetry groups CM
respectively. The protocol which we propose here is based on four coherent states (number of bases N = 2). The initial state
at Alice’s side is
∣∣√µ0〉0⊗|vac〉SB, where |vac〉SB is the sidebands vacuum state and ∣∣√µ0〉0 is the carrier wave coherent state
with the average number of photons µ0 emitted from a coherent monochromatic light source with frequency ω .
The state at the Alice’s modulator output is a multimode coherent state
|ψ0(ϕA)〉=
S⊗
k=−S
|αk(ϕA)〉k, (2)
with coherent amplitudes
αk(ϕA) =
√
µ0d
S
0k(βA)e
−i(θ1+ϕA)k, (3)
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where θ1 is a constant phase and d
S
nk(βA) is the Wigner d-function that appears in the quantum theory of angular momen-
tum43. Argument of the d-function βA is determined by the Alice’s modulation index mA, disregarding the modulator medium
dispersion this dependence can be written as
cos(βA) = 1− 1
2
(
mA
S+ 0.5
)2
. (4)
The detailed description of electro-optic modulation process for quantum states can be found in44.
Detection
The traveling wave phase modulator on the Bob’s side has the same modulation frequency Ω as in the Alice’s one, but a
different phase ϕB and modulation index mB. The resulting state is also a multimode coherent state
|ψB(ϕA,ϕB)〉=
S⊗
k=−S
|α ′k(ϕA,ϕB)〉k, (5)
with coherent amplitudes
α ′k(ϕA,ϕB) =
√
µ0η(L)exp(−iθ2k)dS0k(β ′), (6)
where η(L) is the transmission coefficient of the quantum channel. New argument of the d-function is
cosβ ′ = cosβA cosβB− sinβA sinβB · cos(ϕA −ϕB +ϕ0) , (7)
where θ2 and ϕ0 are phases determined by phase modulator structure
44. In order to achieve constructive interference, Bob
should use ϕ0 as an offset for his phase and apply microwave phase ϕ = ϕ0+ϕB in his modulator. According to
36 the average
number of photons arriving at the first arm of Bob’s detector in the transmission window T is
n1 (ϕA,ϕB) = µ0η(L)ηB
(
1− (1−ϑ) ∣∣dS00 (β ′)∣∣2) , (8)
ηB is the losses in Bob’s module and ϑ is carrier wave attenuation factor. Thus the average number of photons arriving at the
second arm of Bob’s detector is
n2 (ϕA,ϕB) = µ0η(L)ηB(1−ϑ)
∣∣dS00 (β ′)∣∣2 , (9)
After simple mathematical manipulations, we obtain
β ′ = βA
√
(δ 2+ 2δ cos(ϕA −ϕB +ϕ0)+ 1), (10)
where δ = βB/βA. Then, depending on Bob’s phase choice ϕB, the photon number difference is proportional to either xk or
pk quadrature. When bases coincide the power arriving at Bob’s detectors will be greater either at its first or second arm,
depending on the phase difference. The argument of d-function βA (and, subsequently, modulation index) is determined
by mean photon number which is selected to maximise secure key rate. Parameter δ , as a ratio of modulation indices, is
optimized in order to achieve the same distinguishability of quadratures for different phases in a correctly chosen basis, so
that (n1 (0,0)− n2 (0,0)) = |n1 (pi ,0)− n2 (pi ,0) |. Hence, Bob observes quadrature distributions that are symmetrically offset
with respect to zero.
Quantum bit error rate
Succeeding the detection stage for pulses in correct bases we obtain two probability density distributions (Fig. 2) that contain
information about binary signals. Our channel is characterised by excess noise variance Ξ and vacuum noise variance, which
is constantly defined as V = 1/420,45. So, the probability density to obtain v conditioned by the amplitude αk is:
p(v|ϕA +ϕ) =
√
2
pi(1+Ξ)
e−2
v−
√
η(L)αk
1+Ξ , (11)
The overlap between the distributions contributes to the bit errors. Bob can set the threshold value v0 in order to reduce
the number of errors, then Bob expects "0", if v < −v0 and "1", if v > v0, thereby increasing inconclusive result. Therefore
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for each choice of basis it has two input values, Alice’s bits x = {0,1}, and three output values: Bob’s bits y = {0,1} and
an inconclusive result or y =?. Considering the quantum channel as a binary symmetric channel (BSC), one may estimate
detection probability density (1−g), where (g) is erasure, and the probability density that Bob assigns the wrong bit value (e),
in other words, if ϕA = ϕB = pi we obtain:
1− g = p(0|ϕ)+ p(0|pi+ϕ), (12)
e =
p(0|pi +ϕ)
p(0|ϕ)+ p(0|pi +ϕ) . (13)
After the post-selection stage, bit error rate is Q = E/P, where E is error probability and P is post-selection rate.
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Figure 2. Quadrature distributions for correct basis with threshold values {−v0,v0} with ϕA = ϕB = pi .
Holevo bound
Let us consider a collective attack in the asymptotic limit on infinitely long keys for the case of our system and compute the
corresponding asymptotic collective key rate using the Devetak-Winter approach46. We estimate an upper bound for Eve’s
knowledge about the data using Holevo bound47 for weak coherent states. Finite-key analysis for our protocol is presented in
the following section.
Here we use direct reconciliation scheme. In this case Alice sends error correction information to Bob and the secret
key is determined by Alice’s data. Eve can rotate all states stored in her quantum memory after reconciliation and before
her measurement. Holevo bound can be found considering unconditioned channel density operator. The Eve’s quantum state,
conditioned on Alice’s data, is
|ψE(ϕA)〉= |ψ0(ϕA)〉. (14)
Eve needs to discriminate between the states in one basis
ρ =
1
2
|ψE(0)〉〈ψE(0)|+ 1
2
|ψE(pi)〉〈ψE(pi)|. (15)
The Holevo bound is given by
χDR = S(ρ)−∑
k
pkS(ρk), (16)
where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy, index k enumerates the possible states in the quantum channel, ρk is the ancilla state
under condition that kth state was attacked, pk is the weight of the kth state. The von Neumann entropy of a density operator
is the Shannon entropy of its eigenvalues. The eigenvalues of the channel density operator ρ are
λ1,2 =
1
2
(1±|〈ψ(0)|ψ(pi)〉|) . (17)
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Figure 3. Secure key rate K dependence on channel loss in SCW CV-QKD system with discrete modulation including two
cases of asymptotic key: with excess noise Ξ = 0, Ξ = 0.1 and Ξ = 0.2.
The overlapping of our states can be described as
〈ψ(0)|ψ(pi)〉= exp[−µ0 (1− dS00(2βA))] . (18)
We therefore obtain the Holevo bound using binary Shannon entropy function h(x):
χDR = h
(
1
2
(1− exp[−µ0 (1− dS00(2βA))]
)
. (19)
Now we are able to estimate the secure key generation rate K:
K =
∫ ∞
v0
(1− g)
NT
[1− h(e)− χ ]dv. (20)
The secret key rates as functions of channel loss are shown in Fig. 3. The parameters of the system are T = 100 ns, ηB = 10
−0.64,
θ = 10−6, ϕ0 = 5◦. We consider the ideal case and the case of the excess noise variance Ξ = 0.1. The parameters µ , µ0 and v0
are optimized so as to maximize the secret key rate. The value v0 was optimized for losses at various distances. Equation (20)
describes only the asymptotic case of infinitely long key sequences. In order to evaluate real keys it makes sense to carry out
another estimation taking into account finite-key effects.
Secure key generation rate with finite-key effects
To estimate appropriate bound on secure key rate we consider the notation of Rényi entropies since they describe the worst
case and not the average one9,49. We bound ε-smooth min-entropy41,49,50 as follows:
H
εs
min(A|E)≥ n
(
H(A|E)− δ (εS)√
n
)
, (21)
where
δ (εs) = 4log(2+
√
2)
√
log
(
2
ε2s
)
, (22)
here and H(A|E) is conditional von Neumann entropy and it denotes the entropy of Alice’s bit conditioned on Eve’s side-
information in a single round, Eve’s side information is E. Conditional von Neumann entropy in case of direct reconciliation
can be bounded as H(A|E)≥ 1− χDR. On the error correction step both parties should check and remover the errors in their
bit strings. Here we assume that Alice and Bob use low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes51. Bob randomly chooses a k bits
and sends them to Alice, then Alice estimates the quantum channel parameters. It should be noted that LDPC codes succeed
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Figure 4. Secure key rate R dependence on channel loss in SCW CV-QKD system with discrete modulation for different
number of detected quantum bits n.
only if the actual error rate value Qreal is less than a reference value parameterized in the code. Thus, Alice needs to consider
an additional error rate fraction ∆Q. It can be estimated in order to maximize the probability of successful error correction
in one round while keeping the secret key rate as high as possible. Then Alice computes the syndrome of LDPC code that
corrects up to n(Qest +∆Q) error bits. We denote the length of the syndrome as
codeEC ≈ n fECh(Qest +∆Q), (23)
where fEC is error correction efficiency. Using the syndrome, Bob corrects the bits forming some new bit string B’ and applies
a two-universal hash function with output length checkEC. Bob then sends the hash to Alice in order to check whether their
strings match. If the hashes are different, Alice enlarges ∆Q or aborts the protocol. Otherwise Alice obtains the bit string A’.
The remaining smooth-entropy is
H
εs
min(A’|E)≥ n
(
H(A|E)− δ (εS)√
n
)
− k− codeEC− checkEC, (24)
where sample size k is estimated by maximizing the key rate41. At privacy amplification step Alice and Bob hash their bit
strings to a key of length l41,52
l = n
(
H(A|E)− δ (εS)√
n
)
− k− codeEC− checkEC− lossPA, (25)
At the error correction step, we have to estimate "correctness error" εEC. From the properties of 2-universal hashing εEC is
εEC = 2
−checkEC , (26)
The trace distance d between the protocol output and an ideal output is bounded by d ≤ εs + εPA. We therefore obtain that the
protocol is εQKD-secure and correct protocol, with εQKD = εEC + εs + εPA. Finally, the dependence of average secret key rates
on losses in the quantum channel for different values of n is
R =
∫ ∞
v
1− g
NT
·
(
1− χ− 4 1√
n
log
(
2+
√
2
)√
log
(
2
ε2s
)
− 1
n
(
k+ codeEC + log
1
εEC
+ log
1
εPA
− 2
))
dv.
(27)
It should be noted that in the asymptotic case n → ∞, the equations (20) and (27) converge to the same expression. The
secret key rates for different values of n are presented in Fig. 4 as a function of channel loss. The parameters µ , µ0, k and
v0 are optimized so as to maximize the secret key rate. The value v0 is also optimized for losses at various distances. The
considered security parameters are as follows: εs = εPA = 10
−10, εEC = 2−256.
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Discussion
In this paper we proposed the implementation of CV-QKD protocol using SCW method, build a mathematical model of the
proposed scheme and demonstrate the security proof technique. We calculated the secure key rate for discrete modulation
CV-QKD protocol with post-selection in the asymptotic and finite-size regime. We calculated the lower bound on the secret
key rate for the CV-QKD system under the assumption that the quantum channel noise is negligible compared to detector noise
and Eve is restricted to collective attacks. Our calculation shows that the system allows to provide a secret key for channel
losses up to 9 dB in a realistic system implementation. It is important to note that our scheme also allows to implement
CV-QKD with Gaussian modulation and the presented security analysis can be adopted there. Subsequent works will focus
on a full security proof, as well as the experimental implementation of the proposed protocol.
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